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BOUNDARY-ENFORCING
DECISIONS,
AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE
BRANCH THEORY OF
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
RICHARD H. PILDES*

The Court’s 5-4 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
1
Company Accounting Oversight Board presents the most expansive
vision of presidential power over the structure of administrative
agencies in perhaps ninety years. In holding that the design of the
relationship between the president, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (the Board) violated the president’s Article II powers, the
Court found, for the first time, that the design of an administrative
agency was unconstitutional even though Congress had not taken one
of three steps: inserting itself directly into the removal process;
inserting itself directly into the appointments process; or inserting
itself into the substance of agency policymaking by retaining a
2
congressional veto power over the agency’s actions. In all prior
decisions in which the Court had held the design of an agency to be
unconstitutional, at least one of these three forms of congressional
3
grabs at greater control had been involved. Yet, in an expression of

* Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, NYU School of Law. My thanks to
Rachel Barkow for comments. I represented seven former Chairmen of the SEC who appeared
as amici curiae throughout the litigation to defend the constitutionality of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.
1. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
2. Id. at 3147.
3. See. e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1986) (holding that Congress may not
hold the power of removal of the comptroller general); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (ruling that legislative vetoes of administrative decisions are
unconstitutional).
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the “unitary executive branch” vision of presidential powers under
Article II, the Court held that the Board’s design was
unconstitutional, not because it left Congress too much control over
4
the Board, but because it left the president too little.
I. THE IDIOSYNCRATIC NATURE OF THE CASE
Despite the extent to which the Court’s rhetoric and outcome
endorsed an exceptionally robust view of presidential power over
administrative governance, the implications of Free Enterprise Fund
for the more general struggle between Congress and the president
over administration remain obscure because the case presented such
an idiosyncratic context. The Court had never seen an administrative
agency structure like the one at issue; the structure was obscure
enough that I do not believe any major administrative law scholarship
had noticed or addressed this peculiar structure before. In the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Congress had created a new
entity—the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board—to
5
regulate accounting firms that audit public companies. Rather than
creating a new, freestanding agency, Congress decided to put this new
board inside the SEC. The SEC was given a vast array of powers over
the Board, including control of the Board’s budget, the power to
appoint its heads, the power to decide whether to permit Board rules
to go into effect, and the power to control all the Board’s enforcement
6
and sanctioning decisions. The one power the SEC lacked, however,
was to fire Board members at will. Instead, the SEC could fire Board
7
members only for demonstrated “good cause.” Thus the idiosyncratic
nature of this structure emerged: Congress had insulated the Board
from presidential control through two “for cause” removal
protections. First, the president could remove SEC commissioners not
8
at will, but only for good cause. Second, the SEC itself could remove

4. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164 (“[T]he Act before us imposes a new type of
restriction—two levels of protection from removal for those who nonetheless exercise
significant executive power. Congress cannot limit the President’s authority in this way.”).
5. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.A.).
6. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7211(e)(4), 7217 (West 2009).
7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(e)(6) (West 2009).
8. See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (finding that
independent agencies are not subject to the president’s “illimitable power of removal”).
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Board members only for good cause. Thus, the Court confronted for
the first time an administrative entity twice insulated from direct
presidential control by good cause removal protections. Although the
Court had long held that Congress could prohibit the president from
removing agency heads except for good cause, the Court had never
seen, much less been asked to assess, agency heads doubly insulated in
this way.
Moreover, as the case was litigated, it confirmed the idiosyncratic
nature of this dual for-cause removal structure. Neither the Solicitor
General nor the Board was able to document more than a handful of
other places in the government where officials with major
policymaking responsibility, like Board members, were doubly
10
protected through for-cause removal provisions. Hence, it seems
likely that the Court, relying on the government’s own
representations about the essential uniqueness of the Board’s
structure, decided Free Enterprise Fund on the understanding
(accurate or not) that few other administrative agencies, officials, or
11
actions would be affected by its decision. On the other hand, the
dissent marshaled a parade-of-horribles catalogue of officials
throughout the government who appear to be doubly insulated from
direct presidential removal, and thus are perhaps situated analogously
12
to Board members. The Court majority dismissed many of these
examples as far-fetched and effectively rejected some of them out-of13
hand. Despite the dissent, then, it still seems likely that the Court
believed it was deciding a case with limited practical effect on other
agencies.
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court thus had something of a free
pass in invalidating the Board’s structure: it could hold this peculiar
9. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(e)(6) (West 2009).
10. See Brief of Respondent at 43, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861) (noting examples in the Postal Service, Foreign Service
Labor Relations Board, and Social Security Administration).
11. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159
(2010) (remarking that “the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is highly unusual in committing substantial
executive authority to officers protected by two layers of for-cause removal”).
12. Id. at 3179 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I still see no way to avoid sweeping hundreds,
perhaps thousands of high level government officials within the scope of the Court’s holding,
putting their job security and their administrative actions and decisions constitutionally at risk.
To make even a conservative estimate, one would have to begin by listing federal departments,
offices, bureaus and other agencies whose heads are by statute removable only ‘for cause.’ I
have found 48 such agencies.”).
13. See id. at 3160 (majority opinion) (“[T]he dissent fails to support its premonitions of
doom; none of the positions it identifies are similarly situated to the Board.”).
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design to be an unconstitutional limitation on the president’s Article
II powers without putting much else about the structure of
administrative government up for grabs. Indeed, the immediate stakes
were even lower, for the Court concluded that it could sever the
constitutionally offensive provision—the provision that barred the
SEC from firing Board members except for good cause—and then
14
permit the SOX Act to remain in effect and fully operative. Thus, the
case gave the Court an opportunity to strike a blow for a general
principle that, at some point, presidential control over the agencies
can become so attenuated as to violate Article II. And yet the Court
could do so in a context that had no practical effect on SOX itself, and
perhaps minimal effect, if any, on any other agency. Free Enterprise
Fund provided the Court a rare opportunity for a seemingly “free
declaration” of abstract principle.
II. TWO WAYS OF READING FREE ENTERPRISE FUND
Given the idiosyncratic context of the case, then, what does the
Court’s decision portend for many still-unresolved questions about
the relationship between the president, Congress, and control of the
administrative state? That depends on which of two kinds of decisions
Free Enterprise Fund turns out to be. One possibility is that it is a
substantively transformative decision, in which the forceful rhetoric
and analysis concerning presidential Article II powers presages
further decisions that shift the balance of the constitutional principles
that structure control over administration of the laws toward the
president. The other possibility is that Free Enterprise Fund represents
15
what I have previously called a “boundary-enforcing decision.” Such

14. Id. at 3145.
15. See Richard H. Pildes, Foreword, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118
HARV. L. REV. 28, 59–76 (2004) (suggesting that vague constitutional constraints imposed by
the Supreme Court restrain extreme practices and can lead political actors to give those norms
more determinate content in practice). See also Richard H. Pildes, Caperton and The Supreme
Court’s Boundary-Enforcing Role, BALKINIZATION (June 8, 2009, 12:05 PM), http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/caperton-and-supreme-courts-boundary.html
(“[T]here
are
boundaries on the conduct of public institutions and actors – . . . some lines cannot be crossed,
even if it is legally impossible to define those lines with clarity.”); Richard H. Pildes, Caperton
and Boundary-Enforcing Justices Part II: How Vague Law Can Create Stable Outcomes,
BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2009, 2:15 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/caperton-andboundary-enforcing.html (“Vague Supreme Court law can nonetheless lead to stable
legal/policy outcomes.”); Richard H. Pildes, Boundary-Enforcing Supreme Court Decisions Part
III: How Do We Recognize a Boundary-Enforcing Decision, Why We Often Don’t,
BALKINIZATION (June 28, 2009, 10:49 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/boundary-
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decisions establish outer-bound limits on the organization of public
power in exceptional or extreme contexts—they establish that certain
structures or actions have gone “too far”—but those boundaries
remain vague and the Court does not relentlessly pursue the logic of
those limiting principles all the way to their ultimate conclusion.
A. Decision of Broad Principle with Significant Doctrinal Effect
The most conventional way to read a Supreme Court decision is
through the rational elaboration of its internal legal logic. That
approach is the bread-and-butter of doctrinal legal scholarship; it
assumes that future courts in subsequent cases will apply the
immanent legal logic of a decision in a consistent way and will follow
the relevant legal principles to their logical limit. If the principle on
which a decision rests logically points to decisions that will unsettle a
good deal of existing practices and institutional arrangements, reading
a decision in this conventional way assumes that the Court will
therefore invalidate those structures and arrangements when the
Court confronts them in future cases. Free Enterprise Fund reflects a
robust principle of presidential entitlement to control administrative
government. Thus, if the Court’s decision is approached in purely
doctrinal terms, the question is what the decision will mean for a
range of specific issues that all implicate the “unitary executive
branch” vision or theory of the president’s powers under Article II of
the Constitution.
As David Barron has helpfully defined the nature of the dispute
concerning the unitary executive branch theory of Article II:
There are agencies, and there is a White House. Are they to
be one and the same—a monolith in which the agencies do
the bidding of the President? Or are they to be separate—a
federal executive of functional specialization that permits
norms of expertise, professionalism, and the rule of law to
operate within agencies free from the influence of
16
presidential policy preferences?

enforcing-supreme-court.html (asserting that boundary-enforcing decisions occur reasonably
frequently, and not always in closely divided cases).
16. David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age
of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (2008).
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The unitary executive branch conception of the administrative state
implicates a variety of specific issues. For example, when Congress
delegates discretionary decisionmaking power to an administrator, is
that decision ultimately one the president must, by virtue of Article II,
have the power to make? Peter Strauss has incisively captured this
point by asking whether the president is the ultimate “regulatory
decider,” so that all discretionary decisions of the agencies are
17
ultimately his to make. Or is the president instead a more limited
overseer of the regulatory state, one who has various tools to oversee
regulation and regulators, but one whom Congress can preclude from
being a decisionmaker should Congress want to rely instead on the
technical expertise or other skills of administrative officials? Similarly,
can the president issue directives to the heads of the agencies,
including the independent agencies, and order them to take, or refrain
from taking, particular discretionary actions?
Pushed to the furthest limit, the unitary executive branch view
asserts that independent agencies are inherently unconstitutional and
18
that the Supreme Court in Humphrey’s Executor erred by permitting
independent agencies to exist. According to the unitary executive
branch view, the president must be able to control all the discretion
that Congress has delegated to administrators; thus, the president
must have the power to fire any federal administrator who refuses to
follow the president’s policy preferences in areas in which the
administrator is exercising discretion (even on the unitary executive
branch view, the president cannot order an administrative official to
take an action that would violate the law). Moreover, there are also
softer forms of potential legal rules that partly reflect the spirit of the

17. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 696 (2007) (“When Congress confers authority on the
Environmental Protection Agency(“EPA”) to regulate various forms of pollution . . . is it in the
law’s contemplation giving the President the authority to decide these matters, or only to
oversee the agencies’ decision processes?”). For other important commentary on these issues,
see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 492–515 (2003); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas
H. Ginsburg, Commentary, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1075, 1082–83 (1986); Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for
a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987–88 (1997); Alan B. Morrison, Commentary,
OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1059, 1059 (1986); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965,
967–68 (1997).
18. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935) (holding that the
President’s unlimited removal power extends solely to “purely executive officers” and
independent agency officials may only be removed as specified by Congress).
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unitary executive branch view without going this far in endorsing it:
Justice Elena Kagan, as an academic, argued that statutes should
generally be read to give the president the power to control the
discretion of administrators, unless a statute expressly delegates
19
decisionmaking power to the administrator.
The unitary executive branch vision of Article II has always been
based more on an interpretation of the Constitution’s original
conception of the Presidency, and on the practices of presidents
20
through the years, than on anything in the Supreme Court’s case law.
Indeed, the only case that strongly supports this vision is Myers v.
21
United States, written, perhaps not surprisingly, by former President
Taft. And surely it is no accident that Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion
22
in Free Enterprise Fund refers to Myers as a “landmark case.” Chief
Justice Roberts’s characterization is particularly noteworthy because,
since the 1930s, the Court has confined Myers to a narrow realm and
23
has cabined it in even more since the late 1980s. Thus, it is also not
surprising that the bulk of the Court’s justification in Free Enterprise
Fund for its expansive conception of the president’s Article II powers
comes not from the case law, but from early constitutional debates in
Congress, Madison’s letters, the Federalist Papers, and similar non24
judicial historical sources. These have always been the fields on
which the unitary executive branch view has blossomed.
Given the robust conception of the president’s Article II powers
to control the administrative state reflected in Free Enterprise Fund,
future courts could seize upon the principles and language of the
decision to support application of the unitary executive branch view

19. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2251 (2001)
(suggesting that Congress has the ability to restrict the President’s power over administrative
functions and personnel, but typically leaves “more power in presidential hands than generally
is recognized.”).
20. See generally STEPHEN CALABRESI AND CHRISTOPHER YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) (cataloguing the
assertions by presidents of their right to remove from office at will any official exercising
executive power throughout American history).
21. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (holding that Congress had
unconstitutionally interfered with the President’s removal power).
22. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3152 (U.S.
2010).
23. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686 (1988) (asserting that Myers only dealt with
situations where Congress was assuming the power of removal).
24. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151–52, 3156–57 (stating that the Framers believed
the removal power to belong inherently to the executive and that this power was necessary to
maintain the balance between the branches of government).
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beyond the peculiar context of dual for-cause removal structures. That
Chief Justice Roberts self-consciously planted the seeds for further
extensions of that view is quite likely. The unitary executive branch
view was created (critics would say) or recovered (supporters would
say) during the early years of the Reagan presidency as an
administration that saw itself with a deregulatory mandate sought to
bend what it perceived as recalcitrant bureaucracies to the new
25
president’s policy agenda. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
worked at high levels in the executive branch during those years;
there is no reason to think they are not as sympathetic to the unitary
executive branch view as the other elite Reagan administration
26
lawyers who advanced that view during those same years. Indeed,
Justice Alito gave speeches endorsing the unitary executive branch
27
position before he was appointed to the Court.
Free Enterprise Fund presented Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito with their first opportunity on the Court to endorse the
understanding of Article II that underwrites the unitary executive
branch view. That they took the opportunity to do so comes as no
surprise. Moreover, based on her scholarship and work in the White
House, Justice Kagan is more likely to give this view a sympathetic
ear than Justice Stevens, at least in the context of some related
28
issues. That is not to say that Free Enterprise Fund’s reasoning will be
taken to its most extreme potential limit; the Court, for example,
seems unlikely to revisit the question of the constitutionality of
administrative agencies given how much water has flowed under that
bridge. But in areas in which the doctrine is still indeterminate, or the
legal questions presented novel (such as some of the questions noted
above), Free Enterprise Fund could logically be read, as matter of
internal doctrinal development, to support the president over
Congress in future constitutional conflicts concerning control of the
administrative state.

25. See Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Building the Unitary Executive from the Inside-Out (19811988) and the Outside-In (1989-2008) (unpublished draft) (paper delivered at Western Political
Science Association Annual Meetings, April 2, 2010) (detailing the history of the internal
executive branch development of this position).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Judge Alito’s View Of the Presidency: Expansive Powers, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 5, 2006, at A1 (quoting Alito as saying: “The president has not just some executive
powers, but the executive power—the whole thing.”).
28. See Elena Kagan, supra note 19, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. at
2251.
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B. A Boundary-Enforcing Decision of Limited Effect
It is also possible that Free Enterprise Fund is instead a more
limited “boundary-enforcing decision” confined to the peculiar and
limited context of dual for-cause removal structures. Boundaryenforcing decisions are a major but unappreciated feature of Supreme
Court constitutional decisionmaking. These decisions typically arise in
contexts in which the Court perceives powerful competing
constitutional values and principles to be at stake, and in which the
Court believes the relevant public or private actors have pushed one
set of those competing principles to an extreme extent. In these
decisions, the Court seeks to restore that balance by invalidating the
action that has taken one side of these competing principles to a
29
(perceived) extreme.
Boundary-enforcing decisions of this sort are primarily expressive
in character. That is, the Court’s decision is designed to express the
view that one set of constitutional values cannot be ignored
altogether. Such decisions reflect the view that both sides of the
constitutional tension must be given their due. Characteristically,
decisions of this sort end up with doctrine expressed in terms of vague
principles rather than bright-line rules that define clear, necessary,
and sufficient criteria of their application. Boundary-enforcing
decisions draw a line in the sand; they indicate there is some limit,
which courts will enforce, to particular constitutional principles. But it
is also characteristic of these decisions that the Court does not
develop the full logical implications of the decision. Doing so would
be inconsistent with the raison d’etre of the boundary-enforcing
decision: the point is to assert that some balance must be maintained,
not to endorse one side of that balance wholeheartedly and for all it is
worth.
30
To illustrate, here are three brief examples. United States v. Lopez
is such a decision in the area of Congress’s powers under the
Commerce Clause. In holding that some outer boundary existed on
the power of the national government under the Clause, the Court
drew an inherently vague line whose central importance was to

29. For a somewhat similar view of the ambiguous nature of the decision, see Paul
Clement, Free Enterprise: Doctrinal Shift or Snoozefest?, SLATE, June 29, 2010,
http://www.slate.com/id/2257937/entry/2258635/.
30. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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express the principle that Congress’s powers were not without limit.
At the time, some saw Lopez as foreshadowing a revolution in
federalism jurisprudence, in which the Court, following Lopez to its
full limits, would radically cut back on the scope of Congress’s powers.
But of course, no such revolution transpired. That is because Lopez
was not a transformative decision; the Court did not develop the legal
logic of that decision for all it might have been worth. Instead, Lopez
has come to stand for the expression of a general principle, which is
necessarily somewhat vague in application, that, although the powers
of the national government in the modern age of nationally integrated
markets are vast, they are not without some limit.
32
Similarly, Shaw v. Reno is a boundary-enforcing decision with
respect to the permissible role of race in public policymaking,
particularly in the redistricting context. The Court felt the force of two
competing constitutional values: the legitimate use of race to foster
the values of political inclusion versus the concern to minimize the
use of racial classifications. Navigating between these values, the
Court held that extreme manipulations of election district designs for
33
racial purposes were unconstitutional —even though it was clear, as
the dissenters argued, that there was no precise way to define how
34
much influence of race in district design was “too much.” Justice
O’Connor believed that the Court’s role was to plant a flag to
establish that some limits existed—even if those limits could not be
35
defined with precision. As with Lopez, some read Shaw as the first

31. Id. at 556 (“[E]ven these modern-era precedents which have expanded congressional
power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer limits.”).
32. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
33. See id. at 657–58 (describing the Court’s approach to racial classifications, and holding
that a race-based redistricting plan “demands close judicial scrutiny” and may violate the Equal
Protection Clause if it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest).
34. See, e.g., id. at 671 (White, J., dissenting) (commenting on the majority’s “imprecise”
use of terminology and stressing that a redistricting plan that “segregates [is] functionally
indistinguishable from any of the other varieties of gerrymandering”); id. at 680 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“Unlike other contexts in which we have addressed the State’s conscious use of
race, electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of
race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population.” (internal citations
omitted)).
35. See id. at 657 (majority opinion) (“Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of
lasting harm to our society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our
history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. Racial classifications with
respect to voting carry particular dangers. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes,
may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of
a political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
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step on the way to the Court holding all race-conscious districting
36
unconstitutional. Again, though, the Court did not come close to that
result. Instead, Shaw expressed the principle that government actors
had to respect some outer limit on the role of race in the districting
process, but did not lead to a dramatic unwinding of the practice of
racial redistricting.
Finally, the Court’s due process decision concerning money and
37
judicial elections, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., is likely to be a
boundary-enforcing decision, rather than one that is followed to the
full breadth of its logical potential. Caperton presented what the
38
Court called “extreme facts” and “an extraordinary situation.” The
Caperton Court held that, at some point, a party with a direct financial
interest in pending litigation can spend so much money trying to elect
or defeat a judicial candidate who will participate in that litigation
that due process requires that candidate, once on the bench, to recuse
39
himself from adjudicating anything concerning that litigation.
Caperton is unlikely to lead to an extensive body of due process
recusal law. Instead, it draws a line in the sand to express the principle
that, at some extreme point, due process can be compromised by
massive spending on judicial candidates in the context of pending
litigation.
Free Enterprise Fund might similarly be a boundary-enforcing
decision of this sort: important for the principle it reflects that some
limits exist on the process and form of congressional insulation of
agencies, but not a decision that significantly transforms doctrine or
practice. The dissenting opinion nicely articulated the competing
40
constitutional principles and values at stake. On the one hand, the

Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. It is for these reasons that
race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.”).
36. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with
Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593 (1994) (comparing Shaw v. Reno
to Plessy v. Ferguson and Dred Scott v. Sandford).
37. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
38. Id. at 2265.
39. Id. at 2265–67 (holding that “[o]n these extreme facts the probability of actual bias rises
to an unconstitutional level,” and asserting that, although most issues pertaining to judicial
disqualification will be resolved before getting to the level of a constitutional issue, the
Constitution will, on rare occasions, require the recusal of a judge).
40. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3165–67
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the tension between Congress’s power to enact
statutes that are “‘necessary and proper’ to the exercise of its specifically enumerated
constitutional authority” and constitutional principles—such as the separation of powers—that
limit Congress’s power to structure the federal government).
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Court had long recognized that Congress ought to have a great deal
of latitude in designing administrative agencies in response to
constantly changing circumstances, as long as Congress did not itself
seek to capture control over the agency through inappropriate
41
means. Thus, the Court has long upheld the constitutionality of
independent agencies, such as the SEC, in which the head of the
agency can be removed by the president only for good cause. On the
other hand, as the dissent also acknowledged, Article II of the
Constitution vests the president with the executive powers of the
government. In order to execute those powers the president must not
be too removed from effective control over those who administer the
42
laws.
Justice Kennedy was in the majority in all of the cases I
characterize as boundary-enforcing decisions, as he was in Free
Enterprise Fund. That Justice Kennedy is often the decisive vote in
these boundary-enforcing decisions is no accident: central to Justice
Kennedy’s conception of the role of the Court, like Justice
O’Connor’s before him, is the view of the Court as a balance wheel in
the overall structure of American political institutions. Justice
Kennedy sees one of the Court’s essential roles to be the insistence
that boundaries exist on the conduct of public institutions and
actors—that some lines cannot be crossed and that it is the Court’s
role to police those boundaries even if it is not possible to define
those boundaries with sharp legal precision or clarity. Thus, Free
Enterprise Fund might be a boundary-enforcing decision precisely
because Justice Kennedy viewed Congress as simply having taken the
legitimate constitutional values of agency independence “too far.” The
peculiar, idiosyncratic structure of the Board—with the Board twice
insulated by for-cause removal protections—might have been thought
to tip the balance between the competing constitutional concerns too
43
far in one direction. After all, as the Court pointed out, if Congress
41. See id. at 3165–66, 3168 (discussing the “needed flexibility” granted to Congress
through the Necessary and Proper Clause and the benefits of a “functional approach [which]
permits Congress and the President the flexibility needed to adapt statutory law to changing
circumstances”).
42. See id. at 3165 (“[The structural separation-of-powers principle], along with the
instruction in Article II, § 3 that the President ‘shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed,’ limits Congress’s power to structure the Federal Government. Indeed, this Court has
held that the separation-of-powers principle guarantees the President the authority to dismiss
certain Executive Branch officials at will.”(internal citations omitted)).
43. The dissent argued that the Court could have avoided the constitutional question
altogether by holding that the statute creating the SEC does not limit the president to removing
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can create two layers of independence, what is to stop it from creating
44
five layers? (The answer might be practical, not logical; in over 200
years, Congress has never tried to do so.) Perhaps, for Justice
Kennedy, the specter of limitless insulation of agency officials
suggested a system out of kilter, one in which it was important for the
Court to express the principle that the president’s Article II powers
must also be given their due. If that view is what accounts for Justice
Kennedy’s vote, then Free Enterprise Fund might define an outer
boundary on congressional control over the design of the
administrative state without standing for a more expansive
endorsement of the unitary executive branch view in general.
Boundary-enforcing decisions come in various forms. At times,
Justices explicitly signal, through narrowing concurring opinions, that
their agreement with the majority is limited and that the decision at
issue should not be assumed to have broad implication. That is what
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor did through their concurrences in
45
Lopez. But boundary-enforcing decisions do not always come with a
narrowing concurrence attached. Neither Shaw v. Reno nor Caperton
SEC commissioners only for good cause, but instead permits presidential at-will removal. The
statute does not contain any textual provision incorporating a good-cause removal standard.
This is perhaps not surprising, since the Act was enacted during the era in which Myers, which
suggested such provisions were unconstitutional, was the governing law. Nonetheless, based on
central features of the SEC’s structure, which Congress typically uses for independent agencies,
such as the SEC’s multi-member structure and fixed terms of office, the courts, including the
Supreme Court, have assumed for years that SEC commissioners can only be removed for good
cause. Holding that the Act did not in fact so constrain the president would have eliminated the
constitutional problem that troubled the Court, but would have destabilized the long-standing
understanding that the SEC is an independent agency; as a practical matter, such a holding
would have more radical, with more far-reaching, consequences than the Court’s holding that
the dual for-cause removal structure was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, it is perhaps some signal
of the importance to the Court of establishing a boundary principle on the extent to which
Congress can insulate administrative officials that the Court bypassed an opportunity to decide
the case on a formally narrower statutory, rather than constitutional, ground.
44. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3154 (majority opinion) (“Indeed, if allowed to stand,
this dispersion of responsibility could be multiplied. If Congress can shelter the bureaucracy
behind two layers of good-cause tenure, why not a third? At oral argument, the Government
was unwilling to concede that even five layers between the President and the Board would be
too many. The officers of such an agency—safely encased within a Matryoshka doll of tenure
protections—would be immune from Presidential oversight, even as they exercised power in the
people’s name.” (internal citation omitted)).
45. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
history of the judicial struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause during the transition from the
economic system the Founders knew to the single, national market still emergent in our own era
counsels great restraint before the Court determines that the Clause is insufficient to support an
exercise of the national power. That history gives me some pause about today’s decision, but I
join the Court’s opinion with these observations on what I conceive to be its necessary though
limited holding.”).
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v. Massey included such concurrences (and it is too early to be certain
that Caperton will be applied in as limited a way as I anticipate).
Sometimes, Justices will try to engage in boundary-enforcing not by
holding the action at issue unconstitutional, but by stating forcefully
that there is some line out there whose crossing would create
unconstitutional action—even as the Justices uphold the action at
issue. This is what Justice Kennedy has attempted to do concerning
claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering; his opinions
announce that extreme partisan gerrymandering might be
unconstitutional in some context, even as he has not yet held any
46
particular gerrymander to violate the Constitution. But boundaryenforcing decisions that actually drop the hammer by holding action
unconstitutional, instead of merely threatening to do so in some
future case, are likely to be of greater practical effect to both political
actors and lower courts.
We can only speculate about what leads a Justice to signal
explicitly when a decision should be understood in only limited,
boundary-enforcing ways. Certainly the absence of such a signal
makes it more likely the lower courts will apply the decision in the
more conventional way. Perhaps it depends on how potentially
disruptive the Justice fears the decision will be. In the context of
Lopez, in which the Court held Congress’s exercise of Commerce
47
Clause power unconstitutional for the first time since the New Deal,
it was easy to anticipate in advance that the decision would spawn
enormous uncertainty and concern that the Court was about to limit
dramatically long-established congressional powers. Perhaps it
depends on how aware a Justice is of the most expansive potential
interpretations latent in a particular decision; Justices have varying
levels of expertise in different areas of the law. Or, perhaps the answer
lies in more mundane matters, such as how much time or interest a
Justice has in a particular case.
Moreover, that the five-Justice majority in Free Enterprise Fund is
internally divided on the meaning and scope of the decision is also
46. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311–14 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (asserting
that under a Fourteenth Amendment standard it is possible that a reapportionment scheme
could be found unconstitutional, and contending that “[though] no such standard has emerged
in this case [that] should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future. Where
important rights are involved, the impossibility of full analytical satisfaction is reason to err on
the side of caution.”).
47. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of the Commerce Clause).
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entirely possible. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito might hope that the decision becomes a transformative one
on the scope of the president’s control over the administrative state.
Justice Kennedy, none of whose prior opinions suggests he endorses a
robust view of the president’s Article II powers in this area, might
understand the decision as a more limited, boundary-enforcing one
made necessary by Congress’s creation of a novel structure that
pushed the limits of prior constitutional understandings. As with all
decisions, which kind of decision Free Enterprise Fund turns out to be
will not be knowable until the Court chooses to speak on these
questions again.

